Algorithmic Game Theory: 7th International Symposium, SAGT by Ron Lavi

By Ron Lavi

This booklet constitutes the refereed lawsuits of the seventh foreign Symposium on Algorithmic online game conception, SAGT 2014, held in Haifa, Israel, in October 2014. The 24 complete papers and five brief papers provided have been conscientiously reviewed and chosen from sixty five submissions. They conceal numerous very important features of algorithmic video game idea, resembling matching concept, video game dynamics, video games of coordination, networks and social selection, markets and auctions, cost of anarchy, computational points of video games, mechanism layout and auctions.

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Extra resources for Algorithmic Game Theory: 7th International Symposium, SAGT 2014, Haifa, Israel, September 30 – October 2, 2014. Proceedings

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As before, let O be the optimal assignment, and Ot ⊆ O be the subset of the optimal assignment that remains after t steps of RSD. Consider step t + 1, and let Ht be all information available after t steps. We choose agent a uniformly at random from the remaining agents, and then a chooses item i that he prefers 22 M. Adamczyk, P. Sankowski, and Q. , edge (a, i) has the greatest value among edges { (a, i)| i ∈ I t }. The number of agents without an assigned item is exactly n − t after t steps, and 1 hence the probability of choosing a particular agent is n−t .

We say that a bin B ⊆ I is a valid bin if t∈B st ≤ 1, that is, if its load does not exceed 1. Changing the strategy of an item means that it moves to be packed in a different (non-empty or empty) bin. For 0 ≤ k ≤ n, we define a k-bin to be a bin that has exactly k items, and a k + -bin is a bin that has at least k items. The cost of an item packed into a valid k-bin (for k ≥ 1) is k1 . We let the cost of an item that is not packed into a valid bin be infinite. The deviation of an item t packed in a k1 -bin B1 (where t is included in the number of items of B1 ) to a k2 -bin B2 (where t is not included in the number of items of B2 ) is beneficial if s(B2 ) + st ≤ 1 (since otherwise the cost of the item in the alternative bin is infinite) and k2 ≥ k1 (as otherwise its cost is not reduced by moving).

On a conjecture by gale about one-sided matching problems. Journal of Economic Theory 52(1), 123–135 (1990) Stable Marriage with General Preferences Extended Abstract Linda Farczadi, Konstantinos Georgiou, and Jochen K¨ onemann University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada Abstract. We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic.

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